A resolution against our sovereignty and the risk elements within Azerbaijan’s political system

Second, if the European Parliament were genuinely concerned with stability in Armenia, it should have addressed the rights of Azerbaijanis who were subjected to forced deportation, rather than focusing on Armenians who voluntarily left Karabakh, most of whom do not hold refugee status, have long since acquired Armenian citizenship, and therefore do not possess the right of return recognized for refugees. A selective approach to international humanitarian law and human rights indicates, at the very least, double standards. Where double standards prevail, speaking of law and humanism becomes nothing more than hypocrisy.

Third, the claims in the resolution regarding individuals of Armenian origin detained in Karabakh and brought before Azerbaijani courts- whose crimes were proven through fair judicial proceedings- are not substantiated by any evidence of procedural violations. Such statements are aimed from the outset at casting doubt on Azerbaijan’s legal jurisdiction over individuals who committed numerous crimes in Karabakh. This attempt is so absurd that it hardly merits comment. No serious international legal organization accepts such claims. Therefore, the European Parliament’s political declaration has no legal basis whatsoever.

This resolution, a typical manifestation of anti-Azerbaijani hysteria, has also mobilized the radical opposition that has assumed the role of a “fifth column,” as well as their representatives who have taken refuge abroad. Fuad Gahramanli, deputy chairman of the Popular Front Party, writes:

“The Azerbaijani government, after leaving the Council of Europe, is now also interested in ending cooperation with the European Parliament, which demands respect for democratic values and voices criticism over human rights violations.”

Jamil Hasanli, chairman of the Council- an entity that has acted inversely proportional to the concept of “national” since its inception- presents the European Parliament, which adopted this resolution, as an institution defending “human rights and democracy in Azerbaijan.”

Arif Yunus, who has left Azerbaijan, states that “the European Parliament’s raising of the issue of the Armenians of Karabakh was in fact intended to support Pashinyan ahead of elections. By distancing itself from the European Parliament, the Azerbaijani government has, indirectly, taken a step in favor of Russia.”

As can be seen, the opposition’s commentary does not prioritize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, jurisdiction, or the realities on the ground. Driven by their narrow ambitions, by effectively supporting the priorities of the Armenian lobby, they end up legitimizing the primary objective of pressure campaigns against Azerbaijan. Do these individuals truly fail to understand that any direct or indirect support for Armenian revanchism serves to expand the resources of Samvel Karapetyan, the key figure in the Kremlin’s new project in Armenia? I do not think so. At the same time, recalling that Russia attempted to test a similar project in Azerbaijan in 2013, I am not surprised.

Yes, the emergence of pluralism of opinion on any issue is a positive phenomenon. However, every opinion must reflect a hierarchy of priorities in its essence. Before defending any international document, it is necessary to analyze it and reveal its compatibility with national interests. It is impossible to speak of such compatibility within the hierarchy of priorities of parties such as the Popular Front and Musavat, and those in their orbit who praise the European Parliament. Do such organizations- constantly attempting to legitimize geopolitical pressure instruments against Azerbaijan at every opportunity- fail to pose threats to the country’s sovereignty, security, and future by remaining active on the political stage? Rather than answering this rhetorical question, it is worth reflecting on why these organizations, whose compliance with the Law on Political Parties is in question, still remain as legal components of the political system.

My position on this issue is clear. However, let me reiterate: the question is not about the existence of these organizations, but about the compatibility of their activities with the legal and legitimate political system. Therefore, I am compelled to restate the question: how is the sovereignty and security of Azerbaijan as a state protected within the framework of the political party system? If, in a country, the political activities of certain circles create grounds for the application of instruments of external influence, this ceases to be a matter of political competition and becomes a systemic issue. Evaluating this issue within a legal and institutional framework is not only correct, but inevitable.

It is inevitable because the political party system is one of the primary platforms through which the political will of any state is formed. If activity on this platform, instead of strengthening national decision-making, fragments it- and thereby creates additional opportunities for external actors to exert influence- then the political system is drifting away from its legal foundation while its effectiveness declines to a minimum. Therefore, aligning Azerbaijan’s political system with constitutionally grounded strategic objectives is one of the most urgent demands of our time.

Taleh SHAHSUVARLI